

Message Text

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ORIGIN PA-02

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ISO-00 PRS-01 NSC-05

NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00

SP-02 /033 R

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TOSEC 394

E.O. 11652: ; N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

PLEASE PASS RODMAN/ADAMS/BORG FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER.

1. HERewith FULL TEXT MARCH 12 WASHINGTON STAR PAGE 1
QUESTION AND ANSWER FEATURE, INTERVIEW OF FRED IKLE BY
OSWALD JOHNSTON, HEADLINED "IKLE URGES NUCLEAR ARM
SAFEGUARDS."

2. Q. AT THE TIME OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR EXPLOSION LAST MAY
THERE WAS GREAT ALARM IN THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY THAT
THE INDIAN BOMB MIGHT SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS FATALLY, UNDERMINE
THE EFFORT TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECH-
NOLOGY. DO YOU THINK TODAY THAT THOSE FEARS WERE EXAGGER-
ATED OR DO YOU SHARE THEM STILL?

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3. IKLE: THE SITUATION IF ANYTHING HAS BECOME MORE
SERIOUS. THE RIGHT WAY TO LOOK AT THIS NEXT STEP IN
PROLIFERATION, THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, IS NOT THAT INDIA
IS NUMBER SIX IN A SO-CALLED NUCLEAR CLUB, BUT IN A WAY

IT'S NUMBER ONE AMONG A GREAT MANY COUNTRIES TO COME, MAYBE 10, 20 COUNTRIES. THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AMBITION TO DEVELOP TECHNOLOGY IN A LESS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY AND TO HITCH ON TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AS BEING A MEANS TO ADVANCE A GENERAL INDUSTRIALIZATION OF A COUNTRY.

4. Q. DO YOU HAVE SOME OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF THIS? DO YOU HAVE SOME CANDIDATES IN MIND AS POSSIBLE COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE NEXT IN LINE AFTER INDIA?

5. A. WELL, WE CAN ALL WITNESS THE INTENSITY WITH WHICH A GREAT MANY COUNTRIES, AT THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT LEVEL OF INDIA OR PERHAPS EVEN LESS DEVELOPED, ARE ANXIOUSLY TRYING TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. TO BE SURE, THEY STRESS THAT THEY WANT THIS TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, REACTORS, DESALINATION PLANTS. BUT OF COURSE, WITH THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, INEVITABLY, OVER TIME YOU ACQUIRE ALSO THE ABILITY TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY PROVIDES THE POSSESSION OF THE MATERIALS THAT COULD BE USED FOR MANUFACTURING WEAPONS. AND, OVER TIME, PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY OR A MAJOR CAPABILITY OF PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY BRINGS WITH IT THE PERSONNEL AND THE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR MATTERS THAT COULD BE USED TO BUILD WEAPONS.

6. Q. COULD YOU NAME SOME OF THESE CANDIDATES?

7. AMONG THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE INTERESTED IN BUILDING UP THEIR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY POTENTIAL ARE EGYPT, IRAN, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERHAPS OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN ASIA.

8. Q. THE INDIAN CASE WAS A CLEAR CASE OF DIVERSION OF PLUTONIUM FOR A RATHER SMALL REACTOR, WASN'T IT?

9. THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, OF UNCLASSIFIED

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COURSE, DID TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT INDIA HAD REACTORS, HAD BUILT UP A VERY SIZABLE AND VERY SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. INDIA GOT SOME IMPORTANT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE LATE 50'S, ASSISTANCE WHICH WAS GIVEN NOT TO HELP INDIA BUILD A BOMB BUT TO HELP INDIA MOVE AHEAD IN PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY.

10. Q. HOW MIGHT THE INDIAN REACTOR HAVE BEEN SAFEGUARDED?

11. A. WELL, THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN WITH DID NOT MAKE A CLEAR ENOUGH UNDERTAKING TO CANADA THAT A NUCLEAR

EXPLOSION SUCH AS THEY HAVE PREPARED LAST YEAR WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY CANADA. THEY TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS WAS A PEACEFUL USE AND THAT AGREEMENT DID NOT PROHIBIT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AS LONG AS THEY WEREN'T DECLARED TO BE WEAPONS. SO, FOR ONE

THING, AN ATTEMPT IS NOW BEING MADE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO VERY EXPLICITLY PROHIBIT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OF ANY KIND, WHETHER CALLED PEACEFUL OR NOT. SECOND, THE MONITORING, THE INSPECTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY PROVIDES FURNISH A CERTAIN CHECK, A CERTAIN REASSURANCE, OR THEY COULD SERVE AS A WARNING SYSTEM IF INDEED MATERIALS WERE BEING DIVERTED.

12. Q. ISN'T THIS POTENTIALLY AN ALMOST UNMANAGEABLE PROBLEM AS REACTORS PROLIFERATE ALL OVER THE WORLD-- AS YOU HAVE THESE THINGS PRODUCING WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM ON A RATHER LARGE SCALE?

13. A. IT IS AN ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, A PROBLEM THAT WILL TAX OUR INGENUITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO BE PROPERLY MANAGED. BUT WE MUST NOT CALL IT AN UNMANAGEABLE PROBLEM. IF THAT SHOULD BE THE CASE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WOULD BE UNMANAGEABLE. WE BETTER SEE TO IT THAT WE GET ON TOP OF THIS PROBLEM AND PROVIDE THE PROPER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT WHERE THIS MIGHT HELP, TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DANGER
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OF DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO WEAPONS PURPOSES.

14. Q. ARE THERE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS NOW IN DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD DO THIS?

15. A. PERHAPS NOT ENOUGH IS BEING DONE. WE IN THE ARMS CONTROL AGENCY ARE TRYING TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BY DEVELOPING TECHNICAL DEVICES WHICH CAN FACILITATE THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. IN ADDITION, WE ALSO HAVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE IAEA AND PERHAPS BUILD ON IT OR ADD TO IT ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY THAT CAN MANAGE THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AND FLOW OF MATERIALS AMONG A GREAT MANY COUNTRIES THAT ANTICIPATE FOR THE FUTURE.

16. Q. AT ONE LEVEL, IT'S ACTUALLY A POLICE MATTER, ISN'T IT? THERE HAS BEEN TALK OF CRIMINALS OR TERRORISTS GETTING THERE HANDS ON PLUTONIUM. ISN'T THAT POSSIBLE?

17. A. IT IS A NIGHTMARE, OF COURSE, BUT IT'S NOT A COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC ONE FOR THE LONG TERM FUTURE. CLEARLY, THE FIRST TASK FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED

WITH NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IS TO PROTECT THE MATERIALS THAT MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO WEAPONS PURPOSES FROM BEING STOLEN, FROM BEING HIJACKED AND THEN USED FOR CRIMINAL OR TERRORIST PURPOSES. AND THAT JOB IN ITSELF IS A JOB OF MONUMENTAL PROPORTIONS, BECAUSE WE CANNOT TOLERATE A SINGLE FAILURE. BEYOND THAT, OF COURSE, WE WOULD LIKE TO REDUCE THE COMPETITION AMONG NATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES--THAT'S WHAT THE NON-PROLIF- ERATION TREATY IS ALL ABOUT. AND THESE TWO EFFORTS WILL INTERACT AND MUTUALLY REINFORCE EACH OTHER.

18. Q. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS FIVE YEARS OLD THIS YEAR. AFTER THE INDIAN BOMB, AS NOW DRAWN AND CONSTITUTED, IS IT A REALISTIC CHECK ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OR WOULD SOMETHING ELSE BE NEEDED?

19. A. IT IS NOT ENOUGH. IT CAN PROVIDE MUTUAL REASSURANCE. IT IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT FOR THE INDUSTRIALLY CAPABLE COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE UNCLASSIFIED

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TREATY. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY AND MANY WHICH HAVE RATIFIED IT, THAT COULD BUILD A LARGE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR BOMBS IN A SHORT TIME. I THINK IT'S ALL IMPORTANT BEYOND THAT--IN AREAS THAT ARE LESS INDUSTRIALIZED. THERE ARE OTHER EFFORTS THAT ARE NEEDED TO CONTROL THE EXPORT, THE FLOW OF THE TRANSPORTA- TION, THE PHYSICAL SECURITY.

20. Q. SHOULD ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL TREATIES BE DRAWN FOR THAT, OR CAN THAT BE DONE ON AN AGENCY LEVEL, THROUGH THE U.N., ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL LEVEL?

21. A. AS THE UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED IN THE UNITED NATIONS LAST FALL, WE ARE THINKING OF MAKING PROPOSALS FOR A CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, AND WE ARE WORKING ON THAT. THE PROPER FORUM FOR WORKING OUT THE DETAILS ON THAT PROBLEM IS THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ARE NOW GOING ON IN THAT AGENCY ON THE QUESTION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY.

22. Q. AND THIS WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE TERRORIST OR CRIMINAL THREAT?

23. A. RIGHT. THIS IS TO HELP NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TO PRESERVE FULL AND SECURE CONTROL OVER THESE DANGEROUS MATERIALS.

24. Q. DO YOU HAVE A TIMETABLE FOR THIS EFFORT?

25. A. NO VERY SHARP CALENDAR OF EVENTS, BUT I WOULD

SAY WE HOPE TO MOVE AHEAD WITHIN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS.

SAY WE HOPE TO MOVE AHEAD WITHIN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS.

26. Q. UNDER THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF THE NPT, AFTER FIVE YEARS, AND THAT WOULD BE THIS MAY, THERE IS TO BE A REVIEW CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. IS THERE ANY COUNTERVALING DANGER THAT THIS CONFERENCE MIGHT BECOME AN ARENA AT WHICH EXISTING SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY MIGHT DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND GO THEIR OWN WAY BECAUSE OF THIS APPARENT PRECARIOUS DRIFT TOWARDS NATIONALISM?

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27. A. NO, WE DON'T EXPECT THAT. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN, HOWEVER, IS PROGRESS ON SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING RATIFICATIONS. AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THERE IS ENOUGH TIME FOR SOME OF THESE IMPORTANT RATIFICATIONS TO BE COMPLETED. A NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES, SUCH AS JAPAN AND ITALY, HAVE NOT COMPLETED THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION.

28. Q. BUT THEY'RE NOT THE REAL PROBLEMS, ARE THEY? AREN'T THE PROBLEMS POWERS--SUCH AS INDIA ON THE ONE HAND, PAKISTAN ON THE OTHER, EGYPT ON THE ONE HAND, ISRAEL ON THE OTHER--THAT HAVE DECLINED TO SIGN AND RATIFY, AND STILL MORE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, SUCH AS FRANCE AND CHINA, WHO HAVE REFUSED TO COOPERATE AT ALL.

29. A. THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE DETERMINED NOT TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE TREATY OF COURSE CANNOT BE BROUGHT INTO THE TREATY. FOR THOSE SITUATIONS THE TREATY IS NOT THE ANSWER. THE TREATY IS HELPFUL IN AREAS AND REGIONS AMONG COUNTRIES THAT ARE WILLING TO MAKE THIS KIND OF COMMITMENT. AS TO CHINA AND FRANCE, THEY ARE CLEARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES UNDER THE DEFINITION OF THE TREATY. CHINA AND FRANCE, IF EITHER ONE OF THE COUNTRIES DECIDED TO JOIN THE TREATY, THEY WOULD BE CLASSIFIED THERE AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES THE SAME WAY AS THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

30. Q. BY WHICH YOU MEAN THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE?

31. A. WE THINK THEY WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO GAIN.

32. Q. WHAT?

33. A. LENDING SUPPORT TO AN INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING THAT WILL HELP TO SECURE WORLD ORDER WHERE MUTUALLY AGREED MEASURES CAN PROGRESS FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES, AND A BETTER CHANCE THAN IN A KIND OF A WORLD WITH NUCLEAR ANARCHY.

34. Q. IS THERE A REALISTIC PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL
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SEE THINGS YOUR WAY?

35. A. FRANCE AND CHINA? AT THIS TIME THESE TWO NATIONS
HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO BECOME PART OF THE
TREATY.

36. Q. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO BOTH THE
EGYPTIANS AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVEN'T THEY, ABOUT
SUPPLYING SIZEABLE REACTORS?

37. A. ALMOST ALL NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES ARE
TALKING TO ALMOST ALL POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS. THE IMPORTANT
QUESTION IS THAT THE SUPPLIER STATES SHOULD WORK TOGETHER
AND NOT LET THE QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDS BECOME A BATTLE-
GROUND FOR COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE.

38. Q. BUT, IN FACT, ISN'T THERE A DANGER AS THE WORLD
BECOMES ENERGY POOR, THAT THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY
WILL SIMPLY SUPERCEDE THE PRUDENCE OF MAINTAINING
SAFEGUARDS?

39. A. SAFEGUARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES DO NOT STAND
IN THE WAY OF PROVIDING REACTORS FOR ELECTRIC POWER. WE
MUST RECALL THAT WE DO HAVE SO MUCH NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
AROUND THE WORLD, SO MANY REACTORS, SO MUCH PROGRESS IN
THE FIELD PRECISELY BECAUSE OUR COUNTRY, THE UNITED
STATES, HAS BEEN SO GENEROUS IN PROVIDING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY. SO IT'S PUTTING THE QUESTION THE WRONG WAY
AROUND, SAYING THAT THE INTEREST IN NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR
PEACEFUL PURPOSES WOULD GET IN THE WAY OF EFFORTS FOR
NON-PROLIFERATION.

40. Q. ANOTHER AREA OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, IS
THE PEACEFUL EXPLOSION, SOMETHING THE RUSSIANS WANT TO
RETAIN AND, OF COURSE, THE INDIANS CALL THEIR EXPLOSION
A PEACEFUL EXPLOSION. IS THIS POTENTIALLY A SERIOUS
ISSUE IN THIS FIELD?

41. A. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. THERE IS A
VARYING DEGREE OF INTEREST IN THE IDEA THAT NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVES CAN BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES--FOR
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STIMULATING NATURAL GAS, CREATING UNDERGROUND STORAGE
AREAS OR EVEN FOR EXCAVATION. AND OF COURSE, WHAT DISTIN-
GUISHES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE FROM A WEAPON IS PRIMARILY
THE INTENT AND LOCATION WHERE IT WAS EXPLODED. FOR

COUNTRIES HIGHLY ADVANCED IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TECHNOLOGY, EVEN THOUGH THEY GO AHEAD WITH PEACEFUL

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. BUT FOR A COUNTRY THAT IS BEGINNING
WITH A NUCLEAR PROGRAM, THE DISTINCTION DOES NOT HOLD UP.

42. Q. BECAUSE ANY EXPLOSION HAS THE VALUE OF A TEST?

43. A. IT HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BEING A DEVICE THAT
CAN DESTROY A CITY. (END TEXT.) INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE055949
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PA/M:PDENNIS:SBA
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750105-0963
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750399/baaaagtw.tel
Line Count: 337
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN PA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchant0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2003 by HageRS>; APPROVED <26 FEB 2004 by buchant0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: ASWAN
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006